Consider individuals facing an uncertain lifetime (and hence uncertain future income). Each individual must go through (identical) medical checkups. The choice of a medical expert who interprets the results, and hence provides more information about the random lifetime, must be made before the checkup. We show that, in the absence of a life insurance market, a better medical expert is preferred by all individuals. However, when a life insurance market exists, and the medical checkup is carried out before purchasing a life insurance policy, some individuals may choose the inferior medical expert even though the checkup has not yet taken place.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the possibility of disadvantageous information when decision makers face lifetime uncertainty and a life insurance market exists. Life insurance is known to be welfare enhancing, but in our framework, when life insurance is available, information acquisition might be undesirable. Individuals take identical medical checkups to learn about their lifetime random horizon and later use some medical expert to interpret the results. In our framework the choice of the medical expert should be made in advance, i.e., before the checkup. The interpretation of such checkups (through a pre-chosen medical expert) is important, since it determines the updating of their beliefs regarding the random lifetime horizon.
It is not surprising that, in a world where medical examination results are already known, the choice of a better medical expert can be disadvantageous, since more information can worsen the conditions of the life insurance policy (i.e., this may outweigh the benefits from using a more accurate probability distribution in maximizing expected utility over the feasible consumption-bequest plans). However, it is surprising that an inferior medical expert will be preferred ex ante; namely, before taking the medical examination.
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Given lifetime uncertainty and two medical experts, one being ''more informative'' than the other (and, as we show later, in the absence of life insurance, the more informative one is preferred by all decision makers), is it possible that the introduction of a life insurance market will bring about preference reversal by some decision-makers?
We consider here a generalization of the problem studied by Blackwell (1953) . In the case considered by Blackwell and many others, the decision-maker observes a signal (i.e., a medical checkup result) correlated to the random lifetime and afterwards chooses an optimal action following the updating of his or her probability distribution. However, the choice of the better information system (medical expert) is made before the revelation of signals and the choice of any action. Hence, information systems are evaluated according to the possible signals and actions contingent on each signal. A crucial assumption in the Blackwell framework is that the set of feasible actions does not change after the signal is revealed. In contrast, our model assumes that the set of feasible actions that the decision-maker faces may depend on the signal that has been revealed and possibly the information system as well. For example, a signal that discloses a severe heart condition may result in a prohibition imposed by the airline companies on flights.
Consider individuals facing an uncertain lifetime (and hence uncertain future income). Each individual must go through (identical) medical checkups. The choice of a medical expert that interprets the results, and hence provides more information about the random lifetime, must be made before the checkup. We show that in the absence of a life insurance market a better medical expert is preferred by all individuals due to the more accurate assessment of the probability of survival. However, when a life insurance market exists (the medical checkup is carried out before purchasing a life insurance policy), assuming that the insurance premium is contingent on the survival probability, some individuals may choose the inferior medical expert even though the checkup has not yet taken place.
The fact that more information can be disadvantageous is not new to economic theory. Hirshleifer (1971 Hirshleifer ( , 1975 was the first to demonstrate (in an exchange economy) that the existence of a contingent claims market may result in lower utilities to all agents. Later, Radner and Stiglitz (1974) , Green (1981) , Wakker (1988) and others have shown that this can happen for various reasons. In our case (with symmetric information) we demonstrate the following phenomena: In the absence of a risk-sharing mechanism more information, gained from each signal, is ex ante preferred by all riskaverse agents. Once a risk-sharing market is established we may find the opposite, i.e., they are ex ante better off with less information. Moreover, we are not considering marginal circumstances (e.g., very special types of preferences or information systems), nor the non-expected utility decision-makers, but rather straightforward choices of preferences and information systems.
The problem of the effect of information technology on life, health, and other insurance markets is currently at the center of a public debate.
1 The improvement of genetic testing to forecast future health problems raises the question of the insurability of health and life risks, in particular if genetic information is public (as assumed in this article). Politicians are well aware of the potentially devastating effects of genetic testing, and the release of this information, on insurability. The use of genetic information to exclude high-risk people from health care by denying coverage or charging prohibitive rates will limit or nullify the anticipated benefits of the genetic information.
2 President Clinton, for example, recommended banning the use of this information for insurance pricing. Is it desirable to have such genetic information made public? Is it desirable to invest in research that will enable us to interpret this information more accurately? The conclusion of this article casts some doubts about the benefits from more informative structure in this case.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model with signals and information systems where the feasible sets of actions are assumed to be signal-dependent. In Section 3 we consider a life-cycle model with uncertainty about lifetime (which results in uncertainty about earnings as well) and study the impact of information on life insurance policies. The proofs of the main results are relegated to the last section.
THE MODEL
To present a formal model we shall use the terminology used in decision theory with information acquisition. The term signal will stand for results of a medical checkup and the term information system for medical expert. The state of nature is the date of death of the individual. Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } be the set of states of nature, and π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) be a prior probability distribution over S. We assume that each decisionmaker is an expected utility maximizer where her von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function U defined over payoffs ξ(a, s i ) where a ∈B,B is the set of feasible actions. Before taking an action the decision-maker observes a signal y which is correlated to the state of nature. Denote by Y = {y 1 , . . . , y m } the set of possible signals. We take m = n for simplicity. Denote by u(a, s i ) = U(ξ(a,s i )).
An information system P is an n × n row stochastic matrix specifying for each state of nature a probability vector over the set of signals. We denote the (i,j) element of P by P ij to stand for the conditional probability that if the state is s i then the signal y j will be observed. In our model a decision-maker does not observe the true (i.e., prevailing) state of nature but rather observes signals that are generated by those states. Upon receiving a signal the a priori probability vector (i.e., the decision-maker's beliefs) is updated, using Bayes rule, and then actions are chosen in a way that maximizes expected utility.
Let P and Q be two information systems. We say that P is more informative than Q, denoted by P f Q, if there exists an n × n row stochastic matrix R such that Q = PR. The motivation for this definition is that multiplying by R adds some noise (through a process of randomization) to the information contained in P.
Let us demonstrate this definition in the most simple case. Consider the two extreme information systems: The full information system
, which fully reveals which is the prevailing state of nature and
the null information system, which does not affect the prior distribution. That is, a decision-maker using I n will operate under certainty after observing any signal, whereas a decision-maker using E n would not alter her beliefs after observing a signal. Clearly, our intuition is that I n is "more informative" than E n ; that is, E n = I n R with R = E n .
Denote by q y j the probability that the signal y j would be received. In fact,
. Using Bayes rule we find π i (y i ) = π i P ij / q yj the updated (posterior) probability that the state is s i given the signal y j (under the information system P). Define V(P, π , U) the maximal expected utility that can be derived under the information system P. It is given by:
where π i (y j ) is the posterior, i.e., the updated probability of state s i given the signal y j . Now we state:
Blackwell's theorem states that an information system P is "more informative" than an information system Q if and only if every expected utility decision-maker prefers (weakly) using P to using Q.
Consider the following extension of the model described above; assume now that the set B of feasible actions would not remain the same regardless of which information system is available and which signal was received. Instead, assume that to every signal y there corresponds a feasible set, to be denoted by B(P,y); the notation B(P,y) emphasizes the dependence on both elements: the information system and the specific signal.
Within this extended model the value function of information should be adjusted as follows:
Note that the comparison between information systems is done via the value function V * , which, clearly, is an ex ante term.
In such a generalized framework the question whether Blackwell's theorem still holds seems natural. Put differently, given a model with a signal-dependent feasible set, is it always the case that more information is advantageous? It is not difficult to show that for any two information systems with P f Q there exist two families of feasible sets { ( , )} ,{ ( , )} , 2  1  1  2  2  2  3  4   2  1  2  2  2  4 , ,
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To obtain an intuition for that surprising phenomenon one should note that there is a tradeoff between more accurate signals, allowing better decisions, versus more accurate signals, possibly making desirable actions infeasible. Such circumstances of varying feasible sets are not rare in economic models. On the other hand, since in many economic models with uncertainty and signals, signal-dependent opportunity sets arise naturally, and it would be useful to find some criterion that guarantees that more information is preferable. Such a criterion was found in Sulganik and Zilcha (1997) , and it will be used later in this article.
UNCERTAIN LIFETIME MODEL

The Model Without Life Insurance
Consider a discrete-time version of Yaari's (1965) model in which consumers have an uncertain lifetime (and hence an uncertain income). We shall consider both models discussed by Yaari: the model where a consumer's lifetime utility function contains a bequest motive (the "Marshallian model"), and the case where no bequest motive exists (the "Fisherian model"). Let us note, however, that the existence of a bequest motive, which takes place by intergenerational transfers, has a strong empirical basis as one can see from Bernheim (1991) . Although consumers face an uncertain lifetime, let us assume first that they cannot purchase life insurance. This assumption will be relaxed in the next section. Denote the uncertain lifetime horizon by ,a random variable that assumes one of the values 1,2, . . . , T. When = t, 1 ≤ τ ≤ T, it means that she dies during or at the end of periodτ.
Let π = (π 1 , . . ., π T ) be the a priori probability vector related to the random variable T. Let u(⋅) be the consumer's utility function from a one-period consumption, and let φ t (b) be the utility function from bequest b if she dies at the end of period t. However, in the no-bequest case, namely the "Fisherian model' we take φ t (b) ≡ 0. For technical reasons assume that all these functions (whenever non-zero) are strictly concave. Each individual has income stream I 1 , . . . , I T , where I t denotes her non-interest income received at the beginning of the t th period if she is alive and it is known with certainty for all t. Her lifetime total income, however, is uncertain. More specifically, if T realizes at t, then she receives the truncated sequence of incomes {I 1 , . . . , I T }, while {I t+1 , . . . , I T } are lost. Let 0 < δ ≤ 1 be the coefficient of time-preference and let r t , t = 1, . . . ,T, stand for the period t interest rate, which is known with certainty at the beginning of the planning horizon. Denote r k (t) = ( Specifically, if T realizes at t, then b t is the bequest to her offspring.
In our framework, as distinguished from that of Yaari (1965) and Karni and Zilcha (1985) , the individual's choice of the contingent optimal consumption-bequest plan occurs before observing the signal y ∈ Y, (correlated to the lifetime horizon), which is to be interpreted through some medical expert who has already been chosen. For ã
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given information system P, the optimal consumption-bequest plan is chosen, formulated for the bequest-motive case, by maximizing:
where, for simplicity, the dependence of b t and c t on P and y was omitted. In the nobequest case, since φ ƒ ƒ ( ) ,
T T b ≡ 0 we add the constraints that at the end of each period the net savings are not negative, namely, that b t ≥ 0 whenever the probability of death at the end of period t is positive.
The choice of the preferred medical expert P is made by comparing the optima in (3.2) for each available medical expert. Clearly the "better" medical expert is the more informative one.
Assume that the individual's information system is P. Upon receiving her medical checkup results she re-evaluates her prior probability vector related to T, using her medical practitioner.
We shall consider here an economy in which borrowing against future incomes is not allowed if the probability of death is positive. As a result, individuals are not allowed to leave debts to their offspring. Thus, the following definition of feasible consumption-bequest plans seems to us more natural than the one where b t (y j ) ≥ 0 is imposed for all j and all t. Let Clearly, given the information system P, if for each signal y j Prob(T = t | P,y j ) > 0, for t = 1, . . . ,T, then the feasible set is independent of y j . Since the individual does not know with certainty that she will live above a certain age, higher than 1, her consumption-bequest plans must satisfy b t ≥ 0 for all t. However, if for some signal y k (called an excluding signal), there exists a t y k ( )such that Prob | , ) t P y k = =0 for 1 ≤ ≤ t t y k ( ),then the feasible set B(P, yk) is signal-dependent. Now we prove the following result for both models we are considering: with and without bequest motive,
Proposition 1: Let P, Q be two medical experts. In the absence of life insurance markets, ex ante all decision-makers choose the better medical expert.
That is, an individual who cannot acquire life insurance to "smooth" consumption and bequest over her uncertain lifetime ex ante always prefers more information to less. 
THE CASE WITH LIFE INSURANCE
Let us explain first the notion of an actuarial note introduced by Yaari (1965) . This type of interest-bearing note is equipped with the additional condition that it is automatically cancelled if the individual issuing (or purchasing) such a note dies before the redemption date. If, for example, one issues a one-period actuarial note, the note stays on the books and is redeemed at the end of the period if the issuer is still alive. If, however, the issuer dies during this period, his estate is held free of any obligations arising from the note. Clearly, the rate of interest on actuarial notes exceeds that of regular notes, to reflect the extra risk involved.
To emphasize the nature of the competitive market for actuarial notes, we should consider insurance firms engaged in life insurance and annuities in an economy with a continuum of individuals of each age. To provide life insurance, the firm purchases actuarial notes from individuals of age t, t < T and redeems the notes in the next period with interest at rates i t . Clearly, i t depends upon the lifetime distribution function of the individuals. Assuming a competitive market (with zero profits) the equilibrium interest rate i t is given by: 1 / is the conditional probability that if the individual is alive at date t, she shall survive to date t +1. Buying life insurance for Z dollars in this case amounts to selling actuarial notes for Z dollars. The insurance premium is given by (i t -r t )Z. In the annuities case the firm sells actuarial notes to individuals of age t, t=1, . . . , T-1, and buys them back in the next period paying interest at rate i t . Since for each t, ς t = ς t (y; P), it is clear that i t depends upon (y, P). However, we shall suppress this dependence in the sequel.
The following analysis can be done either under the assumption of a bequest motive or in the absence of the bequest motive (namely, the "Fisherian Model"). In the latter case, since lifetime uncertainty results in lifetime risky earnings as well (besides the uncertain consumption) the role of life insurance in this case is as a collateral when borrowing against future incomes is necessary. To examine whether, in this extended framework, it might be the case that the individual prefers less information to more, i.e., the inferior medical expert to the better one, let us explore first the dependence of the feasible set on signals. Denote by z t the amount of actuarial notes sold by this consumer at the beginning of period t, 1 ≤ t < T. When a market for actuarial notes exists, given a signal y j , the feasible set is: The following result holds for both the no-bequest motive case and the case with the bequest motive:
Proposition 2: If a fair life insurance market exists, then some decision-makers will choose the inferior medical expert.
Let us offer the following explanation to this phenomenon. It is important to note that the preference of the inferior medical expert is not an ex post decision after the medical results are revealed, but rather before any medical checkup. Introducing the life insurance market results in an enlargement of the feasible sets available to this individual. However, the cost of life insurance, which is determined by the lifetime probability distribution, depends heavily upon the interpretation of the medical checkup, i.e., the medical expert who has been chosen at the outset. Thus, it is certainly possible that for some results, the higher cost of insurance under the better medical expert ex ante outweighs the benefits from using the more accurate probability distribution.
The fact that a more accurate assessment of the probability of survival, reflected in the costs of life insurance, may ex ante result in preference for less information requires a separate proof for each of the two cases we are considering: with bequest motives and without bequest motives. Let us prove the proposition here for the latter case, the "Fisherian model," and relegate proof of the proposition for the "Marshallian model" to the next section.
Proof of Proposition 2 for the no-bequest motive case:
To prove our assertion it is enough to bring a simple example where, when life insurance markets exist, more information about the lifetime probability distribution results ex ante in less welfare for the consumers. Let T=3 and let the income over time be, I 1 = ε, I 2 = ε, and I 3 = I.
Let the utility function from consumption be logarithmic and assume that future utilities are not discounted. There are 3 signals that may be obtained, y 1 , y 2 , y 3 . Also, assume that π =       1 3 1 3 1 3 , , and r = 0. Consider the case in which the information systems are : P is the full-information system and Q is the null-information system. It is not difficult to verify that although life insurance is available under the information system P , namely, when each signal reveals exactly the state of nature, under y 1 and y 2 the consumer will not purchase any life insurance since income is already at the "best" he can achieve, while under y 3 he shall borrow against his Period 3 income, I, such that his consumption will be equalized over time. Thus we obtain that: 
